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Abstract
Ranking of agents competing with each other in complex systems may
lead to paradoxes according to the pre-chosen different measures. A dis-
cussion is presented on such rank-rank, similar or not, correlations based
on the case of European countries ranked by UEFA and FIFA from dif-
ferent soccer competitions. The first question to be answered is whether
an empirical and simple law is obtained for such (self-) organizations of
complex sociological systems with such different measuring schemes. It
is found that the power law form is not the best description contrary to
many modern expectations. The stretched exponential is much more ad-
equate. Moreover, it is found that the measuring rules lead to some inner
structures, in both cases.
1 Introduction
.
It is of common knowledge that in life one has often to choose some product.
Similar products are ranked, usually according to some criterion. Several crite-
ria can be employed for influencing one’s choice. However the criteria may lead
∗Associate Researcher at eHumanities group, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences, Joan Muyskenweg 25, 1096 CJ Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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to different ranking lists, albeit the bare quality of the product should rationally
be taken as criterion-independent. In several cases, this leads to incompatibil-
ity. One famous example, known as Arrow’s theorem [1] implies that a choice
might not be always logically possible. Practical cases for example occur in
sports, like college football in the NCAA, where the best teams are ranked ac-
cording to voting procedures, by different media. Another team sport, soccer,
is worldly known as also enticing enthusiasm and discussions. Teams (clubs or
countries) are ranked through results of various competitions. However round
robin tournaments, to decide the best team, are rare, although in theory are the
fairest ways to determine a champion among a given number of participants. Of
course, a round robin tournament can also be used to determine which teams
are the poorest performers.
It is well known that a knockout tournament where half of the participants
are eliminated after each round is a faster method of selection, but the method
is highly debatable since it matches teams (or players) somewhat randomly. The
final results being therefore often dependent of the draw, i.e. with biased initial
conditions.
Finally, the so called Swiss system tournaments attempt to combine elements
of the round-robin and elimination formats. This is very usual: the ranking of
soccer countries, studied here, belongs to such a category .
Note that the same considerations can be made for players in individual
sports and also when players are grouped by pairs or triplets, e.g., in golf,
tennis or billiards, petanque (french game of bowls), or more.
The specific scientific literature on soccer ranking themes seems limited to
(i) a 2001 paper by Kern and Paulusma [2] who discussed FIFA rules complexity
for competition outcomes leading to ranking and (ii) a 2007 paper by Macmillan
and Smith, explaining country ranking [3]. From a more general point of view,
one should mention Churilov and Flitman [4] model for producing a ranking of
participating teams or countries, like in olympics games.
There are other papers, quite interesting, - since at the interfaces of various
disciplines, often tied to various technical questions or limited to the analysis
of distribution functions, - thus without conveying questions on e.g. (self-)
organizations of complex sociological systems.
From a scientific point of view, ranking is an old problem with a long history.
The comparison of ”values”, through ranking, has produced dozens of ranking
methods, not only in sports [5], but also for ranking candidates in a political
context, scientists, webpages or various types of ”goods” or ”agents”. Among
many nonparametric procedures relying on counting and ranking processes ap-
plied either directly to the sample data or to some natural function, the most
basic, but immediately useful, analysis pertains to ideas following Zipf ranking
considerations [6]. Thereafter several empirical laws can be imagined as recalled
in Sect. 2.
However, measurements or ranking in sport competitions, though frequently
reported in the media, often lack the necessary descriptive power, as the physics
of complex systems usually present, - with a recent exception [7]. Here below,
an analysis of some ranking data from a specific nonlinear complex system,
i.e. soccer country ranking, as a specific modern society interesting example, is
reported. Two systems, i.e. the FIFA and the UEFA ”measures” are explained
and illustrated in Sect. 3. The section presents a short description of the
studied data and of the ranking rules. The rank-size relationship is searched for
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the FIFA or UEFA ranking, respectively. At first, as in most modern studies
on ranking in complex systems of interacting agents, power laws are expected.
It will be found that they are not subsequently observed in neither cases. A
general discussion of the displayed features and specific comments, leading to
some understanding of the findings, are presented.
The article ends with a discussion of rank-rank correlations as can be pro-
posed from these two sets of data, - and the measuring criteria, in Sect.4, before
a brief pragmatic discussion of findings in Sect. 5 and conclusions in Sect.6.
Two Appendices are also attached to this article. In Appendix A, the ranking
of all FIFA countries is briefly analyzed for completeness. Another (Appendix
B) shows the unexpectedly simple, but yet not explained, ”trivial” correlation
between two UEFA ranking coefficients.
2 On Ranking Laws
Ranking analysis has been performed for a long time since Zipf [6] who observed
that a large number of size distributions, Nr can be approximated by a simple
scaling (power) law Nr = N1/r, where r ≥ 1 is the ranking parameter, with
Nr ≥ Nr+1, (and obviously r < r + 1). Many developments followed such an
observation, e.g. of course in linguistics, but also in many domains [8]. Whence,
Zipf ideas has led to a flurry of log-log diagrams showing a straight line through
the displayed data. It is obvious that a more flexible equation/law,
yr =
a
rα
, (2.1)
is of greater interest, since it has two parameters; it is called the rank-size scaling
law. The particular case α = 1 is thought to represent a desirable situation, in
which forces of concentration balance those of decentralization [8]. Such a case
is called the rank-size rule [8]-[12]. The scaling exponent can be used to judge
whether or not the size distribution is close to some optimum (equilibrium)
state.
The rank-size relationship has been frequently identified and sufficiently dis-
cussed to allow us to base much of the present investigation on such a simple
law. This may be ”simply” because the rank-size relationship can be reached
from a wide range of specific situation [10]-[12].
However, the mere exponential (2 parameter fit) case
y(r) = b e−βr (2.2)
should be also considered. For short hand notations, these two analytic forms
are called Pwl2 and Exp2 in the figures.
In the present paper, three other often used 3-parameter statistical distribu-
tions, generalizing the power and/or exponential law are used to examine the
UEFA data: (i) the Zipf-Mandelbrot-Pareto (ZMP) law reads
y(r) = cˆ/(η + r)ζ ≡ [c/(η + r)]ζ , (2.3)
(ii) the power law with cut-off reads
y(r) = d r−γ e−λr, (2.4)
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FIFA UEFA UEFA FIFA
(UEFA) ”mean” ”points” all
min 0 0 0.92 0
Max 1617 20.857 84.41 1617
Sum 32647 234.41 1098.5 81830
mean (µ) 615.98 4.4229 20.726 391.53
median (m) 606 2.3 14.25 328
RMS 711.23 6.460 29.75 501.17
Std. Dev. (σ) 358.95 4.753 21.553 313.6
Var. 128846.7 22.59 464.5 98346.1
Std. Err. 49.306 0.65287 2.960 21.692
Skewn. 0.6268 1.470 1.486 1.065
Kurt. 0.054 1.646 1.517 1.069
µ/σ 1.716 0.930 0.962 1.248
3 (µ−m)/σ 0.0834 1.340 0.901 0.608
N 53 53 53 209
N0 1 2 0 4
Table 1: Summary of statistical characteristics for Sept. 2012 of national teams
ranking data according to different ”measures”; N is the number of data points;
N0 the number of teams with a 0 value coefficient
(iii) while the stretched exponential is
y(r) = θ xµ−1 e−ν x
µ
. (2.5)
For short hand notations, these three analytic forms are called ZMP3, Pwco3,
and Stx3, respectively, in the figures. Since η, in Eq.(2.3), is not necessarily
found to be an integer in a fit procedure, r can be considered as a continuous
variable, for mathematical convenience, without any loss of mathematical rigor;
the same for the fit parameters a, b, c (or cˆ), d, and θ, and for the ”relaxation
ranks” β and λ (and ν). Note that both α and ζ exponents, in Eq.(2.1), and
Eq.(2.3). must be greater than 1 for the distributions to be well-defined (also
greater than 2 for the mean to be finite, and greater than 3 for the variance to
be finite).
3 Country ranking
First, let the major difference in the ranking of national squads by FIFA [13]
and the ranking of countries1 by UEFA [14] be emphasized. The former results
from ranking following a set of matches between national teams, the latter is
deduced from team ranking of the Association Members [15]. The former serves
to allocate primacy in drawing of groups at the World Cup, the latter to calculate
how many teams per ”country” are allowed to play in the Champions League
and in the Europa League. Both rankings serve a priori different competitions
1More exactly called ”Association Members”: often each ”agent” represents one country,
though not necessarily: e.g., England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Faroe Islands, New
Caledonia, etc. are distinguished.
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Figure 1: An exponential and a power law fit are shown, with the numerical
values of parameter fits and the corresponding regression coefficient R2, sug-
gesting possible and simple empirical relationships between the FIFA coefficient
for the ranked, in descending order, 53 UEFA ”Association Members” in Sept.
2012
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Figure 2: Possible empirical relationships between the FIFA coefficient for the
53 UEFA ”Association Members” (ranked in descending importance order) in
Sept. 2012; three 3-parameter law fits are shown on a log-log plot. The last 3
data points at high rank, with FIFA coefficient less than 100, are not displayed
for enhancing clarity. The corresponding regression coefficient R2 are also given
in Table 2 for comparison with other fits
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Figure 3: FIFA coefficient for the 53 UEFA ”Association Members” (∼
countries) as ranked in decreasing order in Sept. 2012. ”Regimes” are pointed
out by vertical lines. The average regime size ' 6.7 with a (high) R2= 0.994
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and aims, both tied to different economic conditions or interests, - a discussion
outside our present purposes. However, the fact that such rankings are for the
same ”objects” or ”agents” is the underlying signature of the present scientific
questions, mentioned in the Sect.1.
In Sept 2012, FIFA [16], made of 6 confederations [17], grouped 209 Member
Associations squads, ∼ ”countries”, 53 of them being in the UEFA. Therefore
the FIFA ”country” rank value, rF , has to be ”projected” into the UEFA rank
space, rF,U , eliminating out-of-UEFA squads, - thereby giving an appropriate
new rank value for subsequent data analysis, and for comparison with the UEFA
rank, rU .
In the following there is no discussion of the evolution of the rank of any
country; the data pertains to both ranking exclusively in Sept 2012. Neverthe-
less, it is expected that the chosen date, relatively arbitrary, away from major
events, can serve as a valid one for the questions and discussions pertaining to
such a type of data set .
3.1 FIFA Country ranking
The FIFA Country ranking system is based on results over the previous four
years (instead of the previous eight years) since July 2006. It is briefly described
for completeness in Box#1.
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Box #1
FIFA points system
The total number of points depends on results over a four year period as determined
by adding:
• the average number of points gained from matches during the past 12 months
• and the average number of points gained from matches older than 12 months,
thus over the 3 previous years
The number of points that can be won in a match depends on (*)
• the match result (win, draw, loss) (M)
• the match importance (I)
• the ranking of the opposite country (T ), and
• the confederation to which the opponent belongs (C)
The total number of points (P ) is found from
P = M . I . T . C (3.1)
(*) In short,
• M=3, 1, 0 for a win, draw, loss
• I= 1.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0 respectively for any friendly, world cup qualification,
confederation level final competition, world cup final competition match
• T = 200 - the ranking position of the opponenta. The ranking position is
taken from the opponent ranking in the most recent rank list published by
FIFA, and
• C= 1.0 for UEFA and CONMEBOL, 0.88 for CONACAF, 0.86 for AFC and
CAF, and 0.85 for OFC (see [17] for acronyms)
a As an exception to this formula, the team at the top of the ranking is always assigned the
value 200 and the teams ranked 150-th and below are assigned an equal value of 50.
3.2 FIFA(UEFA) ranking data analysis
First, the UEFA countries, as ranked by FIFA, are first extracted from the
overall rank distribution, and their order rF reconstructed such that there is no
gap in the ranking, rF,U . The statistical characteristics of this ”projected” rank
distribution are given in Table 1.
Next, the simple exponential and the power law as fitted to the FIFA coef-
ficient for the ranked, in descending order, 53 UEFA ”Association Members” in
Sept. 2012 are shown in Fig.1. The numerical values of parameter fits and the
corresponding regression coefficient R2 are given. It is at once remarkable that
the power law fit is a poor approximation to fit the data.
Possible other empirical relationships between the FIFA coefficient for the
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53 UEFA ”Association Members” (ranked in descending importance order) in
Sept. 2012 are shown on a log-log plot in Fig.2. The last 3 data points, at
high rank, with FIFA coefficient less than 100, are not displayed for enhancing
clarity. The three 3-parameter law fits are astoundingly similar and rather
undistinguishable. However, the ZMP3 fit, i.e. the more simple generalizing
the power law, appears to be the worse of the three fits. The corresponding
regression coefficient R2 are also given in Table 2 for comparison with other fits.
From the classical linear-linear axes plot in Fig.1 and also from the log-log
plot in Fig.2, some deviation can be observed. However there are not irregularly
distributed on both sides of the fits, but appear as ”regimes”, through jumps at
specific data points, apparently rather regularly spaced.
The UEFA distribution coefficient characteristics are given in Table 1. The
kurtosis and skewness suggest the existence of ”structures”. They are pointed
out in Fig. 3, displaying the Sept. 2012 FIFA coefficient for the 53 UEFA ”As-
sociation Members” (∼ countries) ranked in decreasing order. The ”regimes”
are pointed out by vertical lines. The average regime size is remarkably well
defined, i.e. ' 6.7 with a R2= 0.994.
A posteriori, it might have been expected that a regime size = 8 might have
been underlying, since 8 = 23 (!), which is, as other values of 2m, usual integers
for defining groups and pools in various tournament competitions. The value
6.7 seems to indicate that the intrinsic border between groups is fluctuating, i.e.
only 1 or 2 teams can move from one group to another.
3.3 UEFA Country ranking
The UEFA (association member or) country ranking takes into account the
results of all clubs from each association. (It is used to determine the number
of entries an association is granted for forthcoming seasons.) This UEFA club
coefficient ranking is based on the results of all European clubs in UEFA club
competition, i.e. the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League,
on the five previous ”seasons”. The calculation of the ”country” coefficient
is recalled in Box#2. The club coefficients of success is described on [15] and
reworded for completeness in Box #2 as well. Observe that the rules are more
complicated than a ”win-draw-loss” rating.
Two UEFA country measures exist [14]: the point ranking Up and the mean
ranking Uc. A country rank, either rUp or rUc slightly differs according to the
measure; see Appendix B. The mean ranking is used here below for analysis.
The statistical characteristics of both distributions are given in Table 1.
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Figure 4: Possible simple empirical laws of the UEFA coefficient (i) for the
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ranking, and their rank in Sept. 2012. In each case, both an exponential and
a power law fit are given with the numerical values of parameter fits and the
corresponding regression coefficient R2
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Figure 5: Empirical relationships between the UEFA coefficient (Uc) for the
53 ”Association Members” ( ∼ countries), in decreasing order, and their rank
(rU ) in Sept. 2012, for three 3-parameter law fits; the corresponding regression
coefficient R2 are given in Table 2 for comparison with other fits
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Box #2
UEFA country ranking systems
The total number of points results from the sum of the number of points teams of
an Association have won over a five years period.
• The coefficient Uc is calculated by working out an average score: dividing
the number of points Up (*) obtained, by the total number N of clubs hav-
ing represented an association in both UEFA club competitions., within that
season.
• The resulting figure is then tallied with the results of the previous four seasons
to calculate the UEFA country coefficient.
(*) In short, the number of points won by a team of an Association is calculated as
follows:
• A team gets 2 points for a win and 1 point for a draw, but
• points are halved for matches in the qualifying and play-off rounds.
• 4 points are awarded for participation in the group stage of the UEFA Cham-
pions League and 4 points for qualifying for the round of 16.
• Clubs that reach the round of 16, quarter-finals, semi-finals or final of the
UEFA Champions League, or the quarter-finals, semi-finals or final of the
UEFA Europa League, are awarded 1 extra point, for each round.
The UEFA rankings are updated after each round of UEFA club competition
matches.
3.4 UEFA ranking data analysis
As above, several analytical expressions have been used, i.e. starting from an ex-
ponential law and a simple power law, and their generalization to a 3-parameter
analytical form for searching an interesting empirical relationship between the
UEFA coefficient for the 53 ”Association Members” ( ∼ countries) and their
rank in Sept. 2012, both the exponential and the power law fit, shown in Fig.4,
are hardly convincing.
However, the 3-parameter laws are all very fine and quasi undistinguishable;
see Fig 5. The high agreement between the resulting fits for the 53 UEFA mem-
bers is somewhat interesting. Note that the 3-parameter generalized exponential
behavior ”wins” much over the ZMP3 power law, from a R2 rule point of view;
see Table 2.
Nevertheless, as for the FIFA country ranking2, some marked deviation
seems to occur regularly. In order to emphasize the occurrence of ”regimes”,
the mere 2-parameter exponential and the power law fits are also presented in
Fig. 4 for the top 20 ”countries”. Somewhat surprisingly the R2 value of the
exponential fit slightly decreases (∼ 0.982), while the R2 value of the power law
2and for the UEFA team ranking [18]
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fit reasonably increases to ∼ 0.834. Observe that the numerical parameter of
the exponential is 1/0.08 ' 12. In fact, data steps can be read throughout the
UEFA tables, near multiples of 6. On one hand, it can be claimed that such
statistical results depend much on the finiteness of the data; thus, free to take
these ”small sample statistics” results as trends, rather than securely established
distributions. On the other hand, they also point to inner structures.
4 On Rank-Rank correlation Laws
In order to observe whether there is or not some correlation between the two
ranking schemes, one may calculate the Kendall’s τ rank measure [19]. As done
above, the FIFA all country ranking is projected onto the UEFA country set,
and the ranking rF,U redefined as r ranging from 1 to 53. The latter can be
compared to the mean ranking rUc (and also to the point ranking rUp, not done
here). The Kendall’s τ measure [19] compares the number of concordant pairs
p and non-concordant pairs q through
τ =
p− q
p+ q
. (4.1)
Of course, p+ q = N(N − 1)/2, where N is the number of ”agents” in the two
(necessarily equal size) sets. A website [20] allows its immediate calculation.
It is found that p = 1100 and q = 278, whence τ = 0.5965.
Under the null hypothesis of independence of the rank sets, the sampling
would have an expected value τ = 0. For large samples, it is common to use
an approximation to the normal distribution, with mean zero and variance, in
order to emphasize the coefficient τ significance, through calculating
Z =
τ
στ
≡ τ√
2(2N+5)
9N(N−1)
. (4.2)
Since N = 53, and σ2τ = 0.00895 one has Z = 6.3057, thereby indicating a large
correlation between the two sets.
Finally, a word on the coefficient distributions is in order, before a specific
discussion on country teams. The skewness is positive, in both cases, necessarily
here, see Table 1. For such right skewed distributions, most data values are
concentrated on left of the mean, with extreme values to the right. Pearson’s
median (or second skewness coefficient) defined by 3(µ−m)σ given in Table 1
confirms that most of the ”area” is below the mean with many countries having
a high rank and low FIFA or UEFA coefficient value. On the other hand, the
kurtosis is much below 3, indicating a platykurtic distribution, i.e. the data
values are widely spread around the mean, - here with a ”long” tail. In some
sense, one obtains a picture of the Matthew effect: the winning countries are
always the same ones, and stay more at the top than others.
5 Discussion
From a pragmatic point of view, it might be worthwhile to list the few top
countries according to their rank in Sep. 2012; see Table 3. The evolution
of the country ranking in both schemes is outside the scope of the present
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R2 for ZMP3 Pwco3 Stx3 Exp2 fits
UEFA 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
FIFA(UEFA) 0.956 0.973 0.972 0.968
FIFA(all) 0.962 0.984 0.981 0.967
Table 2: Numerical values of the regression coefficient R2 for fits (see figures)
with various empirical laws
rank FIFA UEFA UEFA FIFA
(UEFA) (mean) (points) all
1 ESP ESP ESP ESP
2 GER ENG ENG GER
3 ENG GER GER ENG
4 POR ITA NED POR
5 ITA POR POR URU
6 NED NED ITA ITA
7 CRO FRA FRA ARG
8 DEN RUS BEL NED
9 GRE BEL RUS CRO
10 RUS UKR CYP DEN
11 FRA GRE UKR GRE
12 SWE CYP GRE BRA
Table 3: Top twelve soccer countries in Sept. 2012 ranked according to different
coefficients
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study, concerned with finding empirical laws (as discussed above) and rank-
rank comparison, see below. Nevertheless, some behavior of the dynamics of
evolution is manifested in the above data analysis and through the finding of
”regimes”. Note that along the above assertion, some rational explanation of
escaping from obeying exclusively either the power or the simple exponential
laws can be imagined. This explanation also points implicitly to the classifying
groups, and their size, imposed by the UEFA hierarchy in specific competitions.
In brief, England [ENG], Germany [GER] and Spain [ESP] come first. Next,
[ITA], [NED], and [POR] follow the three top European nations3. There is a
mild dissimilarity only between the two types of rankings. This is expected
from a sport fan point of view. Nevertheless, the concordance seems somewhat
puzzling because, on one hand the measures wear on different competitions, and
on the other hand, the ”European club” teams are far from being composed of
their citizens only. This remarks is substantiated by the case of Belgium, for
which the national squad is quasi entirely made of players belonging to clubs
outside Belgium, - the national squad having done rather well in the last few
years, but the Belgian (club) teams made of diverse citizenship players are doing
rather poorly in UEFA competitions.
As of now, something seems to be clear for the UEFA (indirect) classifica-
tion of countries: namely, the majority rule of introducing (club) teams in the
ranking by (national-like) UEFA Association Members goes in its first footing
scheme via a Fibonacci rule or Pascal-like triangle. It may also be viewed as a
saturation effect in a finite system, i.e. the number of ”valuable clubs’, - together
with the finite size of the number of available days for a one year competition.
Bear in mind, however, that the Fibonacci rule is a signature of deterministic
chaos to which no single scaling law applies at a reasonable length. In addi-
tion, recall that the Fibonacci ordering is characteristic of tree or plant branches
ramification to mention but two morphogenetic examples. On the other hand,
it discloses the so called golden division (or, golden ratio) of the whole, thus, a
fairly rational principle of partitioning a whole into smaller pieces.
Those inner structures might be mathematically further studied. Some hint
for further investigation arises through some analogy. These structures qual-
itatively resemble those of polycrystalline type materials [21]. Namely, if a
polycrystal had an intrinsically predetermined initial structure composed of a
certain number of bigger-than-others grains, which is often the case, such grains
would then ultimately survive following (e.g. temperature) cycling [22, 23] giv-
ing the largest contribution to the final structure. It is because such dominating
(in size) grains suffer from more relaxed surface-tension conditions than their
3 After the 2013 all-German Champions League Final on May 25, 2013, between Borussia
Dortmund and Bayern Mu¨nchen, the position of Germany is necessarily strengthened in the
ranking, shifting it up to the level of Spain.
Due to Paris Saint Germain achievements, this club has substituted Twente Enschede from
the Netherlands in the team ranking, - therefore dragging the Dutch score is as low as the
Russian one, and pushing up France above these last two ”Members”. The position of Italy
is rather stiff.
A short comment about the ranking of other specific countries, under the logics of the
presented comparison, seems in order here.. Note that the positions of Ukraine and Russia
have become stiff or unchanged. However, Poland and Bulgaria seem to loose systematically,
- in terms of football rankings, their reputation, although the two associations (countries) got
EU membership after the great political turnover at the edge of the 1980s and the 1990s, - in
contrast with Russia and Ukraine, both countries being still out of EU membership. Belgium,
being ”exceptional”, implies a comment in the text.
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smaller neighbors. Intriguingly, the resulting grain distributions are found to
be squeezed, as is also the Stx3 form used for appropriate fitting, Eq. (2.5).
They can be found obeying the Weibull distributions [21], with a scaling fac-
tor (b therein), becoming time-independent in case when the final structure is
formed. Thus, the structures pre-discovered in Fig. 3 can qualitatively reflect
a hierarchy of grains in a polycrystal, grouping them in size-dependent pools.
Note, however, that the process of long-time polycrystal formation undergoes
better statistics [24] than the one presented here above, more considered as a
trend in the present study.
For the ”countries” as for the team, the inner structure is likely tied to the
pool, first rounds, then to the ”direct elimination” tournament-like process. The
no-power law regime seems therefore to indicate that indeed a tree rather than
a network structure is at hand. Studies of round-robin tournaments with a large
number of competitors/agents seem to be of interest for confirming, or not, the
present findings.
6 Conclusions
In conclusion, it has been searched whether two measuring schemes leading
to ranking corroborate each other, although the schemes are geared toward
different purposes. Moreover, it was searched whether the ranking leads to
simple but empirical laws. The case of European countries ranked by UEFA and
FIFA from different soccer competitions was taken for illustration. It is found
that the power law form and subsequently the rank size rule obviously do not
appear to be the best simple description contrary to many modern expectations.
In fact, it is found that the measuring rules lead to some inner structures,
in both cases. These structures are proposed to originate from the types of
competition and point attribution rules intrinsic to this complex system, i.e. a
tree-like structure in contrast to a network structure. The latter is likely more
appropriate in round-robin competitions. In fine, Arrow’s impossibility theorem
is also illustrated, since the ”ranked preferences” of teams are not univocal, due
to not meeting a set of ”criteria” with three or more discrete options to choose
from.
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Appendix A. All FIFA countries
For completeness, let this Appendix contain a display and short analysis of
the FIFA ranking for the 206 countries which level was recorded in 2012. Note
that beside the UEFA San Marino, three countries, i.e. Bhutan, Montserrat,
and Turk and Caicos Islands, had a coefficient equal to 0.
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Table A1: numerical values of parameter fits and the corresponding regres-
sion coefficient R2 for all FIFA countries in Sept. 2012; see Fig1A for illustration
A few possible and simple empirical relationships, as proposed in the main
text, between the FIFA country coefficient as ranked in Sept. 2012 are shown
in Fig. 6 on log-log plots. Four fits are displayed; the corresponding regression
coefficients R2 are given in Table 2. Except for the Exp2 fit which seems to miss
the low ranked data, the 3-parameter empirical laws seem to be equivalently
precise.
Nevertheless some marked deviation occurs for r ≥ 100. A more detailed
examination of the the difference between the data and the fits indicate large
regions where the difference is either positive or negative. Intersection points
depend on the empirical law, but occur in a close r range. The sign of the
difference defines regimes limited either by r ≤ 45 and r ≥ 145 for Stx3 and
Pwco3 or by r ≤ 40 and r ≥ 140 for ZMP3. This is illustrated in Fig.7. In some
colloquial way, one can thus point to three categories of countries: (i) the top
ones, (i)) the ”soft belly”, and (iii) the ”small” ones.
Appendix B. Correlation between UEFA Points and UEFA Aver-
age Coefficients
The correlation between reordered UEFA points (Up) and UEFA coefficients
(Uc) in Sept 2012
Uc = Up/N (.1)
is shown in Fig.8. There is hardly an explanation for this remarkable fit, nor
any reason why ENG is outside the fit.
The number of concordance pairs p and non-concordance pairs q of the rUc
and rUp leads to τ = 0.9376 from Eq.(4.1); p − q= 1292 and p + q= 1378,
or p=1335 and q= 43. This large value of τ indicates that the two measures
strongly agree, thus are rather equivalent, on the ”evaluation of the countries”.
Moreover from Eq.(4.2), since N = 53, whence στ = 0.0946, one has Z =
9.911, - quite large to reject the null hypothesis, indicating a high correlation
between the two sets.
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Figure 6: Empirical relationships between the FIFA countries rank in Sept.
2012; the corresponding regression coefficient R2 are given in Table A1
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Figure 7: Indication of rank regimes in the FIFA countries in Sept. 2012; fits;
dark vertical lines suggest regime ranges, i.e. when data crosses fits
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